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RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW. RESTITUTION. Warren A. Seavey and Austin
W. Scott, Reporters. Adopted and promulgated by the American Law
Institute. St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers, 1937. Pp. xxv,
1033.
THIS Restatement embraces roughly the subject matter of Quasi Contracts
and Constructive Trusts. Of the three parts into which Quasi Contracts was
divided by Ames1 and Keener,2 the Restatement omits two, namely, the action
on a judgment and the action based upon a customary, statutory or official
duty. By lopping off these gnarled branches the Restatement takes "unjust
enrichment" as the primary basis of the quasi contractual obligation, and thus
brings a more plausible unity into the diverse doctrines here brought together.
In this the Restatement follows the lead of Professor Woodward's admirable
little treatise.3 The rubric, quasi-contract, has long been a catch-all heading, 4
and the Restatement has furthered the movement to make it an intelligible
basic class of legal obligations.
Yet the scope of restitution has been extended beyond the conception of
Ames and Keener, which included only the common law actions for a money
judgment. The Restatement embraces also obligations based upon unjust en-
richment which are enforceable by a suit in equity, and includes restitution in
specie as well as the money judgment (§ 4). Historical limitations upon the
field of quasi contracts are thus broken down in furtherance of the modern
trends in procedure, and the basis of the obligation rather than the historical
or procedural character of the remedy is made the basis of classification. How-
ever, in Part II ("Constructive Trusts and Analogous Equitable Remedies")
the basis of subdivision is still the availability of one or more equitable rem-
edies for the enforcement of a constructive trust, an equitable lien or subro-
gation (p. 640). This is a recognition not merely of historical necessity but
of distinct remedial rights.
The Restatement of Restitution supplements the volumes heretofore pub-
lished on Contracts and Trusts. The former, prophetically, brought forth a
subdivision on "Restitution", 5 which includes the rules as to recovery by or
against a person in default under a contract; and that Restatement also in-
cludes the right of restitution under a contract which has become impossible
of performance or which is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds
or of illegality. These parts of the earlier work are covered by a cross-refer-
ence section (§ 108) in the present volume. The right to restitution under a
transaction induced by fraud, duress or undue influence is stated here
(§§ 28, 70) with a cross-reference to the Contracts Restatement for a fuller
1. Ames, The History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 HARv. L. REv. 64.
2. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1892) 16.
3. WOODWARD, QUASI-CONnACTS (1913).
4. Dig. 44, 7, De 0. et A., 5.
5. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 347-357.
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statement of the grounds of recovery. The important subject of mistake is,
on the other hand, fully elaborated in the present Restatement (§§ 6-69).
Although the investigation of a problem of mistake in a transaction inter vivos
will require the use of both volumes, there is very little overlapping or dupli-
cation. The Restatement of Trusts was so planned as to exclude constructive
trusts, and there is practically no duplication in this instance.
In adopting the single word "Restitution" as the distinctive title of the
volume, the Institute took a bold step. The very choice of a new title for this
fugitive body of legal doctrine was an invitation to depart from the conserva-
tive conception denoted by the general title, "Restatement". The unfamiliar-
ity of the new title should not, however, give rise to any fears on the part
of the bar that the law professors have been playing the game with the deuces
running wild. There are some of us who regret that in some instances the
professional hunch for just law, even when the courts have disagreed, was
not given freer play. The Restatement of Restitution has not justly enriched
the law as much as it might have.
The rivalry between "Restitution" and "Unjust Enrichment" as basic ideol-
ogies or terminologies goes back to the appearance of Keener's pioneer treatise
on quasi contracts.0 The earlier controversy was apparently one of ideology,
that is, what is the deontological (ethical) basis of the doctrines of quasi con-
tracts? In the formulation of this Restatement the problem was rather one of
terminology, that is, what short title will suggest the contents of the volume
and bear the strain of fairly indicating its contents? The term "unjust en-
richment" seems more suggestive, but its appearance with the prestige of the
American Law Institute might have the same unfortunate effect upon a sorely
troubled profession which, according to former Dean Pound, the title of
Ward's "Dynamic Sociology" had upon the Russian Imperial censor-it
suggested "dynamite" and "socialism". At all events brevity vas the decisive
factor in the final choice. Yet each rival gains a victory. "Restitution" gains
the titular honor, while "unjust enrichment" is recognized as the basic prin-
ciple underlying the whole subject matter (§ 1). That the two concepts do
not exactly coincide7 will be relatively unimportant unless those who use the
volume attempt to give them exact meanings and apply them deductively.
The subdivision of this amorphous body of legal doctrine involved further
difficulties in terminology and classification. Part I is entitled "The Right to
Restitution", while Part II is headed "Constructive Trusts and Analogous
Equitable Remedies". The two parts are not mutually exclusive divisions of
the subject matter, since Part I states propositions as to restitution which
are applicable to constructive trusts8 and Part II states additional proposi-
tions as to the right to restitution which are peculiarly applicable to construc-
tive trusts9 and analogous remedial rights. The subdivision is thus based on
expediency and tradition. Traditionally the subject matter of constructive
6. Abbott, Keener on Quasi Contracts (1896) 10 H, v. L REv. 226; Learned
Hand, Restitution or Unjust Enrichment (1897) 11 HAiv. L Rsv. 249. See Patterson,
The Scope of Restitution and Unjtst Enriclnent (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 223, 231.
7. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 230.
8. See, for example, § 163.
9. See, for example, § 164.
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trusts has developed under separate rubrics in digest and treatise, and pro-
cedural differences have kept it apart from quasi contracts. The division of
labor in formulating this fusion of subject matter suggested, if it did not
require, such a partition. All of this may seem pretty obvious; yet it indicates
the conservative character of the Restatement as an articulation of case law.
The chapter headings in Part I display considerable ingenuity in classifica-
tion. After Chapter 2 ("Mistake, Including Fraud") comes "Coercion",
which is made to serve as a blanket not only for duress and undue influence,
but also for judgments, taxes, indemnity and contribution.'" "Benefits Con-
ferred at Request" (Chapter 4) includes the rights of restitution incidental
to contract, and "Benefits Tortiously Acquired" (Chapter 7) completes the
traditional divisions of quasi contracts. Two catch-all headings confine the
cats and dogs :---"Benefits Voluntarily Conferred Without Mistake, Coercion
or Request" (Chapter 5) and "Benefits Lawfully Acquired Which Are Not
Conferred by the Person Claiming Restitution" (Chapter 6). The former
deals with the Good Samaritans who are not too officious, and the latter
includes confusion of goods, accession, finders and other situations which
cannot repose comfortably elsewhere.
The inclusion with the bound volume of a pamphlet containing Notes on
this Restatement, compiled by the Reporters, is a welcome departure from
the usual practice of the American Law Institute. The theory that the Re-
statement rests upon the expertness and authority of the men who drafted
it and of the Institute which corrected and approved it, rather than upon
judicial precedents, is in conflict with the basic theory of the Restatement
and with the practice of those who formulated it." The Restatement is pri-
marily built from the precedents upward into general principles rather than
from general principles downward into particular rules. The precedents are
not the scaffolding but the foundation of the structure. The legal profession
should therefore be given a list of the precedents used in the work. Especially
is this true in the field of quasi contracts. Here precedents are scattered under
different headings in digest, encyclopedia and treatise, and are rendered diffi-
cult of interpretation (especially the older ones) because the opinions are
confused by the language of "implied contract". Moreover, the precedents
for some common situations are scanty because the amounts ordinarily in-
volved do not make it worth while to take the litigation to a court whose
decisions are published. Hence it is to be regretted that the pamphlet contains
notes on less than half of the 215 sections of the Restatement. Even the
scarcity of precedents on a particular section is significant. Since the Restate-
ment style does not permit the expression of any doubts (except through the
formal Caveats), propositions upon which the precedents are few or doubtful
and those on which there was difference of opinion in the advisory group are
stated with the same assurance of certainty as those which are well estab-
lished. The publication of fuller Notes would have helped to indicate these
differences. The very thorough Index (155 pages) adds greatly to the acces-
sibility of the contents of the volume.
10. Here following Woodward, op. cit. supra note 3, Part III.
11. But cf. James, Book Review (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1238.
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As a self-consistent and well ordered set of propositions about a field of
law which is relatively inaccessible through the usual sources and which is
designed to aid in adjusting the conflicts arising from some of the recurrent
abnormalities of human conduct, this Restatement should prove valuable to
lawyers, judges and legal scholars.
EDWIN W. PATTERSON t
New York, N. Y.
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT, 1935. By W. H.
Wagner. Denton, Md.: Rue Pub. Co., 1935. Pp. 155. $2.75.
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION. By P. McCollester and F. J. Clarke.
New York: The Traffic Pub. Co., 1935. Pp. x, 340. $4.00.
THE FIRST book presents the text of the Act with annotations showing
discussions of and changes in the bill between the time it was reported out
of committee and the time it was passed by both Houses of Congress. In
addition, there is a list and brief summary of state and federal court decisions
relating to state motor carrier laws. All of this material appears without
comment. The book is merely a compilation for reference use by those inter-
ested in the formal development of the law in its last stages in Congress.
The second book has a broader purpose. It discusses the growth of the
motor vehicle as a transportation facility and various aspects of state regula-
tion; and then reviews each item of the Motor Carrier Act itself, interpret-
ing where possible the probable meaning of those items in the light of past
decisions in the railroad cases. In an appendix the act itself is reproduced
and some of the early procedural requirements are presented. This material
provides a valuable working manual for those in the motor carrier business,
though changes are occurring so rapidly that it will be necessary to supple-
ment this material with current information.
Neither of these books, however, makes any effort to present the broad
implications of the Motor Carrier Act in relation to the general field of
business regulation. These implications are significant because the Motor
Carrier Act is the latest of a long line of laws passed by Congress to regulate
transportation enterprises, and as such the Act illustrates the ultimate motives
which may be expected to broaden the scope of economic regulation in
general. A brief review of the principal motives behind each step of economic
regulation--economic regulation is used in contrast to technical regulation
covering control of safety standards and the like--will demonstrate the point.
Originally, federal regulation of railroads was proposed in response to
complaint of the farmers against high rates. It was concluded at the time
that the problem was to be solved by enforcing competition rather than by
regulation. In the next thirteen years competition and technical advances
accomplished the desired results, but simultaneously there started a reaction
to competition in the form of consolidations, pools and traffic agreements
which did not augur well for the future maintenance of that competition.
,Professor of Law, Columbia University, Member of the American Law Institute's
Committee on Restitution.
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Further, those twin evils, discrimination and rebating, loomed into a promi-
nence which could not be ignored even by a Senate not too anxious to intrude
in the field of private enterprise. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was
the result. The subsequent erosion of the supposed powers of the Commis-
sion by repeated adverse decisions of the Supreme Court is a matter of
history. The same forces, growth and abuse of monopoly and the evils of
discrimination, together with a revulsion against the financial scandals of the
railroads gave a Roosevelt and his successor the ammunition to make the
early type of regulation really effective by passage of reinforcing legislation
from 1903 to 1910. With 1920, regulation was advanced still further, con-
trol over security issues, new construction and abandonments, excess earn-
ings and consolidations was introduced, and rate and service control was
expanded to provide affirmative powers.
The monopoly power of the railroads, the magnitude of their operations
and the power it engendered, the high proportion of common costs and the
difficulty presented in determining costs for particular shipments or traffic,
the importance of railroad securities to investors and the financial markets,
and the essential part railroad transportation played in the national economy
were all characteristics that directly or indirectly lead to the growing sheaf
of regulations. But when we come to the motor carriers, not a single one
of these characteristics were present. Before the Motor Carrier Act, inter-
state highway transportation was as highly competitive and non-discriminatory
as the strongest exponent of laissez faire could ask. The size of highway
operators was with few exceptions dwarfed into insignificance by a multitude
of existing industrial organizations. The cost of motor operations largely
consisted of direct costs which could, at least, be estimated by all who were
interested. Scarcely any securities were issued to the public. The railroads
were still the backbone of the transportation of the country. So far as the
old reasons for regulation, as applied to the railroads, were concerned, there
was no more reason for economic regulation of the motor carrier than of
corner drug stores.
A significantly new set of motives for economic regulation appeared. First
and most active was the desire of that already regulated facility, the rail-
road, to get relief from motor competition. It was a desire behind which
the railroad managers, security holders and labor could be joined to produce
a tremendous pressure group. Secondly, within the motor carrier industry
itself, some of the bigger units were tired of cut-throat competition, though
that competition was scarcely more than the ordinary small businessman
takes as a matter of course in depression times, so that those units were
sympathetic to control of rates and of new entries in the field. And lastly
there were the motives of those whose philosophy was that of increasing
government entrance info business. They took in their stride the extension
of transportation regulation to cover tens of thousands of motor carriers,
eager to join hands with those of contrary philosophy who sought the regu-
lation for reasons of defense. The one old-time motive present was that of
the request for federal action because state action seemed inadequate, but
that state action itself was motivated primarily by the three new factors, so
the old motive was merely an amplifier of the new.
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The appearance of this new type of motivation is of significance in fore-
casting what may happen in the future in the business world at large. This
fact should not be lost sight of because it is in that special field, transporta-
tion, where the constitutional powers of the government have long been
recognized, rather than in the general business field where the government's
powers are largely yet to be formed.
KENT HEALYt
New Haven, Conn.
TRADE MARx PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING. By Walter J. Derenberg.
Albany, N. Y.: Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1936. Pp. Lxviii, 1162. $20.
The author, a German scholar, has contributed one of the most important
works on trade-marks and unfair competition published in this country. His
work, unlike so many of our textbooks, is not an uncritical digest of the law
with a classification of cases and a collection of citations, nor merely an analyti-
cal or historical presentation of the law as disclosed by the decisions. It is
rather a critical restatement of the law at the present time which includes
a selection of earlier cases underlying the modem development. The exposi-
tion is alive and inspired.
The present book is an expansion of a work in German published by the
author in 1931.1 This may explain the author's first chapter dealing with
certain aspects of our law and procedure, with which American practitioners
are ivell acquainted. The second chapter on the development of the modem
law of trade-marks and unfair trading is easily the most significant in the
book. In clearly written and fully documented pages the author traces the
development of the trade-mark from the "origin and ownership" view to the
notion that "the mark sells the goods"; of the conception that a trade-mark
is "property" to that of expectancy of custom or goodwill as the subject of
protection; of the consequent recognition that the law of trade-marks was but
a part of the broader law of unfair competition; and of the expansion of the
"passing-off" action into the modem law on unfair trading. The author very
properly follows tlis chapter by tracing the jurisdiction and activities of the
Federal Trade Commission in unfair methods of competition. He shows the
impotency of the Commission's work by reason of its limited jurisdiction,
restricted by the reviewing courts, and its confinement to interstate commerce.
The remaining chapters in the book are the conventional ones on what
constitutes a valid trade-mark, secondary meaning, the right to use one's own
name, the scope of the trade-mark rights, the territorial extent of trade-mark
rights, the acquisition and loss of such rights, the effects of Federal regis-
tration, remedies, etc. These are characterized by the same manner of pre-
sentation of the law, critical tracing of development, clarity, and good docu-
mentation. Particularly stimulating in this connection is the discussion con-
tAssistant Professor of Political Economy, Yale University.
1. WVARENZEICHEN UND WVErBEWERSRECHT IN DM VER T  ING,, SUrAmi Voz
AmEPicA (1931.)
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cerning geographical names, 2 descriptive and suggestive words,8 loss of
trade-mark upon expiration of a patent,4 the defense of unclean hands,6 and
assignments and licenses of trade-marks. 6 Some of the matters discussed,
particularly that of assignments and licenses, should probably have been fur-
ther explored. For example, there is no discussion of the questions of use
of the same trade-mark by associated companies ("Club Cracker" case), term
assignment by a foreign manufacturer to a local exclusive agent (Scandinavia
Belting Co. case), and assignment of one trade-mark by a manufacturer
owning several marks for similar goods.
Leaving aside questions of detail, some analysis or conclusion with which
the reviewer may not agree-and these are not many-he would have wished,
in such a fine study, a greater emphasis on the economic and social interests
involved, rather than a purely legalistic interpretation. The author probably
thought this beyond the scope of his book. It is hoped, however, that he
may employ his exceptional faculties to this end at some future time,
New York City. STEPHEN P. LADASt
RECORDS OF A YORKSHIRE MANOR. By Sir Thomas Lawson-Tancred. Lon-
don: Edward Arnold and Co. 1937. Pp. 384, xii.
STRICTLY applied, the title fits only the first 193 pages of the book-a his-
tory of the medieval manor of Aldborough. The remainder of the volume is
concerned with the parliamentary history of the boroughs of Aldborough and
Boroughbridge, from the middle of the seventeenth century till just before the
Reform Bill of 1832.
Rambling and amateurish, and in some places almost naive, the book is
nevertheless far from being uninteresting; it contains a mass of varied infor-
mation-some of it hardly to be had elsewhere-which is not the less instruc-
tive because of the jumbled way in which it is presented. What might have
been an element of decided value in the first part is missing because a mass
of early records are given only in translation, and so the text is lacking in the
original technical expressions necessary for the minute and exact information
desired by professional historians.
The second part, made up largely of private letters which are given in
full, furnishes an unusually intimate, though not always attractive, picture
of electioneering in northern England in the days when a very limited suffrage
put power at the polls in the hands of a comparative few.
The book is very much in need of an index.
New Haven, Conn. G. 
E. WOODBINE't
2. Pp. 238 ff. 5. Pp. 659 ff.
3. Pp. 257 ff. 6. Pp. 571 ff.
4. Pp. 619 ff.
tMember of the New York Bar.
t Professor of History, Yale University.
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